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THE PREMARITAL ESTATE CONTRACT AND
SOCIAL POLICY
PAUL G. HASKELLt
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE PREMARITAL ESTATE
CONTRACT
Prior to marriage the prospective husband and wife may enter into
a contract wherein each, or one of them, releases or limits his or her
dower, forced share and intestate rights in the estate of the other in the
event he or she survives. Dower and the forced share provide the sur-
viving spouse a portion of the estate of the decedent spouse of which
the survivor cannot be deprived by the will of the decedent.' Some-
times premarital contracts contain a waiver of or specific provisions for
alimony and property division upon divorce, and occasionally such
contracts purport to limit the support obligation upon separation dur-
ing marriage or while the parties are living together. This article deals
with the premarital contract which defines the rights of the surviving
spouse in the estate of the decedent spouse, but the other type of pre-
marital contract will also be discussed briefly for the purpose of
perspective.2
The law of the premarital contract which controls the rights of the
surviving spouse in the estate of the decedent spouse has developed
largely by judicial decision. In recent years, however, some states have
legislated on the subject as a result of the Uniform Probate Code which
has a section dealing with it.3 The opinions of the courts in this area
are frequently less than models of precise deductive logic. It seems that
the subject matter lends itself to verbal rambling and rather blurred
t Visiting Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; A.B. 1948, LL.B. 1951, Harvard
University.
1. For a discussion of dower and the forced share, see text accompanying notes 16-30 infra.
Dower, as used in this article, is intended to include the husband's curtesy interest in the wife's
land. Forced share is often referred to in the law as elective share or dissent from the will. The
community property system, which exists in eight states, does not have dower or the forced share.
The spouses own equally all property acquired during the marriage, except that which is acquired
by gift or inheritance. This provides some protection against disinheritance.
2. See text accompanying notes 33-40 infra.
3. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-204. For states which have adopted this provision, see note
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application of principles to facts. A distillation of the cases does, how-
ever, produce certain principles which are purportedly determinative of
the validity of such contracts in the absence of statute.4
The courts have viewed the premarital estate contract very differ-
ently from the conventional arm's length trading transaction. By its
nature the premarital estate contract provides for a release of rights of
the surviving spouse without compensation therefor, or for a desig-
nated amount paid at or about the time of the marriage or to be paid
from the estate, or for a fraction of the estate which is less than what
the survivor would expect to be entitled to pursuant to his or her rights
at law. The prevailing judicial view is that if the premarital settlement
of the rights of the surviving spouse in the estate of the decedent spouse
is not substantively fair under the circumstances existing at the time the
contract is executed, the contract is not enforceable, unless at the time
of the contract the surviving spouse was adequately informed of the
property of the decedent spouse and its value, either by express disclo-
sure by the decedent spouse or from other sources, was aware of the
rights she was giving up, and was not unduly pressured to execute the
contract. In other words, if the provision is not reasonable as of the
time of the contract, then it must appear that the deprived spouse knew
what she was doing when she signed the contract and did it voluntarily.
Enforceability is determined in accordance with the alternative criteria
of substantive fairness or fairness in the making of the contract. It is
usually held that if the spouse challenging the contract establishes that
the contract was substantively unfair, a presumption arises that she was
uninformed or unduly pressured, which places the burden of proof on
those issues upon the party upholding the contract.6
4. The historical concept ofjointure with respect to dower was the antecedent of the modem
premarital estate contract. In jointure the prospective husband would transfer an interest in land,
to become possessory at his death, to his prospective wife, which would bar her dower. Her assent
was not necessary. Later a settlement of personal property would bar dower. It also developed
later that the wife's assent was required under jointure. The antenuptial contract has replaced
jointure in modem times. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.38, .39 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
5. Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 112 So. 2d 451 (1959); Norrell v. Thompson, 252 Ala.
603, 42 So. 2d 461 (1949); Potter v. Collin, 321 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied,
336 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1976); Watson v. Watson, 5 Ill. 2d 526, 126 N.E.2d 220 (1955); Wilson v.
Wilson, 157 Me. 119, 170 A.2d 679 (1961); Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967);
Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 452 P.2d
560 (1969); In re Estate of Hillegass, 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968); Schutterle v. Schutterle, -
S.D. -, 260 N.W.2d 341 (1977); Batleman v. Rubin, 199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957); see H.
CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1.9, at 30 (1968); 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREE-
MENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90, at 36 (rev. ed. 1953). See also Comment,.lntenuptial
Contracts Determining Property Rights Upon Death or Divorce, 47 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 31 (1978).
6. Wylie v. Wylie, 249 Ark. 316, 459 S.W.2d 127 (1970); Watson v. Watson, 5 Ill. 2d 526, 126
N.E.2d 220 (1955); Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938); In re Estate of Cobb,
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It should be noted that there is authority that the requirement of
substantive fairness may be satisfied although the surviving spouse has
waived her interest completely and has received nothing in exchange;
this would be so if the surviving spouse had independent means or the
capacity to earn an adequate living.7 If the surviving spouse does not
have property or a vocation which would assure her an adequate in-
come, substantive fairness will usually require a provision which is not
disproportionate to her rights at law on the basis of the property of the
decedent spouse at the time of the contract. It should be emphasized
that the question of substantive fairness is to be resolved as of the time
of the contract, not as of the time of the decedent spouse's death; that is
to say, if the provision for the surviving spouse was fair in relation to
the decedent spouse's assets at the time of the contract but unfair in
relation to the decedent spouse's assets at his death, the criterion of
substantive fairness would be satisfied.8 It is reiterated that the provi-
sion for the surviving spouse may be either a transfer of assets at or
about the time of the marriage or a promise to provide a specified
amount from or a fraction of the estate in the will of the decedent
spouse.
The alternative criteria of substantive fairness and fairness in the
making of the contract are the consequence of the relationship of trust
and confidence between individuals about to be married which may
cause one of them to relax his or her guard. Obviously the one with
property or the potential therefor who is proposing the waiver of rights,
in whole or in part, is on his or her guard, but the one who is giving
something up may not be on guard. It is inequitable to allow one of the
parties in these circumstances to take advantage of the other's trust by
obtaining a partial or total release which is unfair to the trusting party,
unless the releasing party has been fully informed and not subject to
undue pressure. In the litigation that has occurred, often the initiator
of the contract is the business-wise prospective husband and the waiv-
ing party is the financially and legally unsophisticated prospective wife
305 P.2d 1028 (Okla. 1956); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 452 P.2d 560 (1969); Batleman v. Rubin,
199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957). There is a minority view that no presumption arises. In re
Estate of Abbott, 571 P.2d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Moss v. Stueven, 200 Neb. 215, 263 N.W.2d
98 (1978); In re Estate of Hillegass, 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968).
7. Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967); In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478,
149 N.W.2d 344 (1967); In re Estate of Davis, 20 N.Y.2d 70, 228 N.E.2d 768, 281 N.Y.S.2d 762
(1967).
8. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Rocker v. Rocker, 13 Ohio Misc.
199, 232 N.E.2d 445 (1967); In re Estate of Vallish, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968); see Christians
v. Christians, 241 Iowa 1017, 44 N.W.2d 431 (1950); Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750
(Mo. 1970); Batleman v. Rubin, 199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957).
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who survives and challenges the validity of the contract. Unquestiona-
bly such bargaining imbalance reflecting the traditional economic de-
pendence of the female has influenced the courts to require an
openness in the making of the contract which is not required between
parties bargaining at arm's length.9
The Uniform Probate Code provision on this subject is different
from the prevailing common law view. Section 2-204 reads in part as
follows: "The right of election of a surviving spouse . . . may be
waived, wholly or partially, before or after marriage, by a written con-
tract, agreement or waiver signed by the party waiving after fair
disclosure."
The Uniform Probate Code provision requires that there be fair
disclosure in all cases and makes no reference to substantive fairness.
This means presumably that a premarital contract which is substan-
tively fair but concerning which there was no disclosure of the decedent
spouse's assets is invalid. The prevailing common law view, of course,
is that such a contract would be enforceable. The Uniform Probate
Code provision appears to follow generally, but not in detail, a line of
common law authority to the effect that premarital estate contracts are
valid if there has been disclosure of the decedent spouse's assets, and,
in addition, if the provision for the surviving spouse is disproportionate
to the decedent spouse's assets at the time of the contract, a presump-
tion arises that there has not been adequate disclosure, thereby placing
the burden of proof with respect to disclosure upon the party upholding
the contract. Substantive fairness is never determinative of validity;
9. The premarital estate settlement involves the waiver of rights, in whole or in part, to
which the waiving party would otherwise be entitled by law. There is the issue of the contractual
consideration for that waiver. If both parties waive, each waiver supports the other. If only one
party waives, the marriage itself is sufficient to support the waiver. Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d
83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974); Herman v. Goetz, 204 Kan. 91, 460 P.2d 554 (1969); In re Estate of
Ratony, 443 Pa. 454, 227 A.2d 791 (1971); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 494 P.2d
208 (1972); see 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 5, § 90, at 32.
For federal gift and estate tax purposes, the release by the surviving spouse of her rights at
law in the deceased spouse's estate is not deemed to be consideration for any payment made to her
or transfer made for her benefit in exchange for the release. This means that, pursuant to a pre-
marital or postmarital estate contract, an inter vivos payment to her is a "gift," an inter vivos trust
with retained life income and remainder to her is included in the deceased spouse's estate, and a
payment from the deceased spouse's estate to her is not deductible as a claim against the estate.
This follows logically from the fact that, in the absence of any waiver of estate property rights, the
surviving spouse's rights at law in the deceased spouse's estate are not deducted from the value of
the deceased spouse's property at death for estate tax purposes. The release may be deemed to be
consideration, however, if the parties are divorced within two years following the contract. I.R.C.
§§ 2034,2043(b), 2516; see C. LoWNDEs, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES § 14.6 (3d ed. 1974).
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disclosure alone determines validity.1" A small number of states have
adopted the Uniform Probate Code provision."I
It should be noted that there is limited authority for the position
that the premarital contract must be fair in substance and there must
have been fairness in the making of the contract.' 2 There are also cases
in which no standard for validity is articulated except some general
notion of fairness as of the time of the execution of the contract.
13
The purpose of this article is to suggest that regardless of the ade-
quacy of disclosure and the voluntariness of the settlement, the premar-
ital estate contract should not be enforceable unless it is substantively
fair at the time of the decedent spouse's death, a position which has not
been adopted by any of the lines of authority described above."
10. Megginson v. Megginson, 367 Ill. 168, 10 N.E.2d 815 (1937); Rankin v. Schiereck, 166
Iowa 19, 147 N.W. 180 (1914); Potter v. Potter, 234 Ky. 769, 29 S.W.2d 15 (1930); Levy v. Sher-
man, 185 Md. 63, 43 A.2d 25 (1945); In re Enyart's Estate, 100 Neb. 337, 160 N.W. 120 (1916).
Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 883 (1953), states that disclosure is an absolute requirement for validity, but
many of the cases cited as authority do not support that proposition.
11. The following states have adopted § 2-204 of the Uniform Probate Code: ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.11.085 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2204 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-204
(1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 905 (Cum. Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-204 (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-208 (Cum. Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-7 [6-3071 (Burns 1971);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(144a) (Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91A-2-204
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2316 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-04 (2-204) (1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-204 (1978).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.702 (Harrison 1976) adopts the Code provision except that disclosure
is required for postnuptial contracts but is not required for antenuptial contracts.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.220 (Vernon 1956) provides that the antenuptial contract must be fair
and there must be disclosure.
Some states have statutes which recognize antenuptial estate settlements but do not set forth
standards for validity. Eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-12 (West 1978); D.C. CODE § 19-113
(1973); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-205 (1974); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-
.1(f) (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 114.115 (1977);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.07(1) (West 1971).
12. Christians v. Christians, 241 Iowa 1017,441 N.W.2d 431 (1950); In re Estate of Murdock,
213 Kan. 837, 519 P.2d 108 (1974); In re Estate of Broadie, 208 Kan. 621, 493 P.2d 289 (1972).
These criteria were used in determining the validity of a postnuptial contract settling property
interests in a community property jurisdiction. In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449 P.2d 7
(1969). Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.220 (1955), adopts this position, but Youngblood v. Youngblood,
457 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. 1970), seems to interpret the statute to provide for alternative criteria.
13. Rockwell v. Rockwell, 24 Mich. App. 593, 180 N.W.2d 498 (1970) (postnuptial contract);
In re Estate of Jeurissen, 281 Minn. 240, 161 N.W.2d 324 (1968); McQuate v. White, 389 S.W.2d
206 (Mo. 1965) (postnuptial contract); In re Estate of Moss, 200 Neb. 215, 263 N.W.2d 98 (1978);
Turner v. Turner, 242 N.C. 533, 89 S.E.2d 245 (1955). See also In re Estate of Loftin, 285 N.C.
717, 208 S.E.2d 670 (1974.).
14. In 1976 the Michigan Law Revision Commission proposed that MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.3178(144a) (Supp. 1978), which is the Uniform Probate Code provision on premarital estate
contracts, be amended by adding the following sentence: "If, however, since execution of the
agreement there has been a change of circumstances which would make the enforcement of the
agreement unfair or inequitable, such modification thereof shall be made by a court of equity as
fairness shall require." MICHIGAN LAW REVISION COMMISSION, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 41
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Occasionally the estate contract is entered into during marriage. It
appears from the reported litigation that this is uncommon relative to
the premarital settlement. The courts have generally employed the
same considerations with respect to validity as in the premarital con-
tract,' 5 as does Uniform Probate Code section 2-204.
II. DOWER AND THE FORCED SHARE
There would be little need for a premarital settlement of estate
rights unless the surviving spouse was entitled to a portion of the dece-
dent spouse's estate of which she could not be deprived by the will of
the decedent. A brief discussion of the antidisinheritance devices
which obtain in our legal system and their policy objectives will serve
as background for the subsequent critique of the existing law of the
premarital estate contract.
Historically the wife was protected from disinheritance by dower.
Dower was a property interest of the wife which attached by operation
of law to all real property owned by the husband during the marriage.
While the husband was alive, dower provided the wife no possessory
interest in or other benefit from the land to which it attached. If the
wife predeceased the husband, dower became a nullity. If, however,
the husband died survived by the wife, she was entitled to a possessory
life estate in one-third of the land to which dower attached.
The wife's dower interest was not subject to the claims of the hus-
band's creditors during his life or at his death. Once dower attached,
there was nothing the husband could do without the wife's consent to
get rid of it.' 6 Any transferee of the husband's interest took subject to
dower unless the wife voluntarily released it. Divorce, however, usu-
ally destroyed the wife's dower interest.'
7
A large majority of the states have abolished dower,' as does the
(1976). This proposed amendment has not been enacted. See generally Klarman, Antenuptial
Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Rockwell, 24 Mich. App. 593, 180 N.W.2d 498 (1970); McQuate v.
White, 389 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1965); Inre Estate of Ratony, 443 Pa. 454, 277 A.2d 791 (1971); Inre
Estate of Beat, 25 Wis. 2d 315, 130 N.W.2d 739 (1964).
16. It is accepted that dower can be released by the wife (husband) during marriage by join-
ing in a deed to the husband's (wife's) grantee, without any consideration passing to the releasing
spouse and without regard to the question of disclosure. Presumably this is accepted to facilitate
commerce in land. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 5.34.
17. For a detailed discussion of dower, see id. §§ 5.1-.49. See also 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 11 209-213 (P. Rohan ed. 1977).
18. See E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MuRPHY, GRATUrrous TRANSFERS 142 n.2 (2d ed. 1977);
J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 517-18 (2d ed. 1978); J. ROBIN-
SON, AN AMERICAN LEGAL ALMANAC 107-10 (1978).
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Uniform Probate Code.' 9 Of those that have retained it, some have
modified it in certain respects. For example, some states have limited
dower to land owned by the husband at death; this enables the husband
to transfer good title to his land during his life without any participa-
tion by his wife.2" Today statutes typically provide that at the hus-
band's death the wife must manifest an election to claim the benefit of
her dower interest.
Some states that have retained dower have given the husband the
same interest in the lands owned by the wife during the marriage. His-
torically the husband had much broader rights in the lands of his wife,
under the doctrines of the estate by the marital right and curtesy.
These gave the husband the possessory and beneficial interest in all the
wife's land during the marriage, and, if a child was born alive, a contin-
uing possessory interest for the husband's life after the wife's death.2'
This was essentially a sexist perquisite of marriage, and only inciden-
tally protection against disinheritance. The estate by the marital right
and curtesy no longer exist; if the husband has something called curtesy
today in a particular jurisdiction, it is the same as the wife's dower
interest or substantially so.
22
As wealth came to be held predominantly in forms other than
land, such as corporate stocks, bonds, and bank accounts, dower ceased
to be adequate protection against disinheritance. During the past cen-
tury, most states have enacted forced share statutes to better protect the
surviving spouse from disinheritance.23 The forced share statutes give
the surviving spouse, husband or wife, a certain fraction of the probate
estate of the decedent spouse, of which the surviving spouse cannot be
deprived by the will of the decedent. The fraction is typically the share
the survivor would be entitled to if the decedent died intestate but
never in excess of a certain fraction such as one-half. The probate es-
tate is that property of the decedent which passes through formal estate
administration, ie., the assets owned by the decedent in his sole name
19. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-113.
20. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 189, § I (Michie/Law. Co-op 1969).
21. For a detailed discussion of the estate by the marital right and curtesy, see 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, §§ 5.50-.76. See also 2 R. POWELL, supra note 17, 1 210-213.
22. See E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, supra note 18, at 142; J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, supra note 18, at 518.
23. W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 3 (1960); J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD &
R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 123 (5th ed. 1977); J. ROBINSON, supra note 18,
at 139-43; E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 73 (2d ed. 1973). UNI-
FORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to -207 provide for the forced share.
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or as tenant in common at death. The probate estate is to be distin-
guished from nonprobate assets, sometimes referred to as will substi-
tutes, such as joint and survivor property, life insurance payable to
specific beneficiaries, savings account trusts, other revocable living
trusts, and survivor pension rights, the benefits of which pass directly to
a beneficiary and do not become subject to the estate administration
process. Originally forced share statutes were not applicable to non-
probate assets, but today some include such assets. Some courts have
subjected certain revocable trusts and other inter vivos transfers to the
forced share despite the language of the statute limiting its application
to probate assets.2 4
Under the forced share the interest taken by the surviving spouse
is a fee interest. The forced share is subject to the claims of the credi-
tors of the decedent; if the estate is insolvent, the forced share avails the
surviving spouse nothing. The surviving spouse must manifest an elec-
tion to take the forced share; it is sometimes referred to as "taking
against the will."
Frequently a substantial portion of the decedent spouse's wealth
will be in the form of will substitutes; this may be done to avoid the
delay and expense of probate administration, or possibly to avoid or
minimize the surviving spouse's forced share rights in the estate. Many
forced share statutes are anachronistic in their limitation to the probate
estate. The Uniform Probate Code, which has been adopted in some
states, subjects many nonprobate assets to the forced share, as do the
forced share statutes of several states which have not adopted the Uni-
form Probate Code."
24. E.g., Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973); Cochran's Adm'r v.
Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115 S.W.2d 376 (1938); Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72
(1954); Wanstrath v. Kappel, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947). For a thorough study of this
subject, see W. MACDONALD, supra note 23. Cases are collected and discussed in Annot., 39
A.L.R.3d 14 (1971), and Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 187 (1975). See also Kurtz, The Augmented Estate
Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IowA L.
R v. 981, 993-1006 (1977).
25. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-201 provides the surviving spouse with a forced share of
"one-third of the augmented estate" of the decedent spouse. The augmented estate is defined in
§ 2-202 as the probate estate plus living transfers in favor of others than the surviving spouse such
as revocable trusts, irrevocable trusts with retained life income, joint and survivorship property,
and outright gifts within two years of death in excess of $3000, as well as property owned by the
surviving spouse at the decedent's spouse's death which was received by living gift from the dece-
dent. It is interesting that life insurance and pension benefits payable to someone other than the
surviving spouse are not part of the augmented estate, and remain available as a means to disin-
herit. Outright living gifts without strings or retained benefits generally remain available as a
means of disinheriting the surviving spouse.
Several states which have not adopted the Uniform Probate Code have subjected certain inter
vivos transfers to the forced share by legislation. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 701 (Smith-Hurd
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Some states which have legislated the forced share have also re-
tained dower. If the surviving spouse is dissatisfied with the provision
for her in the decedent's will, she must make an election between dower
and the forced share.26 Almost invariably the forced share will be cho-
sen; as a practical matter, dower will be chosen only if the decedent's
estate is insolvent or heavily burdened with debt.
Why do we have a forced share? What are the reasons which jus-
tify limiting testamentary freedom in this fashion? Certainly one rea-
son is to provide support to the surviving spouse. The forced share is
not limited, however, to the surviving spouse who is in need; it is avail-
able to the survivor who has substantial property of her own, or who is
capable of earning an adequate living. The forced share also deals in-
adequately with the need for support because the fraction does not vary
with the size of the estate; one-third of a $1,000,000 estate would pro-
vide adequate support to a surviving spouse without means, but one-
third of a $200,000 estate would not.
Another reason for the forced share is to compensate the survivor
for her indirect contribution to the accumulation of wealth by the dece-
dent. The traditional family consists of a husband-father who earns
money and a wife-mother who keeps house and cares for the children.
The homemaker's efforts free the husband to work and thereby contrib-
ute to the wealth accumulated in the husband's name. The forced
share, however, is not limited to the wealth accumulated during the
marriage. It is also available to the working husband who survives the
homemaking wife who has inherited wealth from her parents. The
forced share is also available to the surviving spouse of the second mar-
riage late in life during which there was no homemaking or wealth
accumulation.27
The forced share is a rather crude means of achieving the objec-
tives of support and compensation for contribution in circumstances in
which such considerations obtain. If such considerations do not obtain,
the forced share may be justified as the sharing which inheres in the
marriage relationship regardless of financial need or compensation. It
Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 473 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-616 (1977); N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(b)(1) (McKinney 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.213 (West
1975); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6111 (Purdon 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.150(1) (Vernon
1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.17 (West 1971); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(b)(1)
(McKinney 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-616 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 473 (1974).
26. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(139) (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1976).
27. For a discussion of the social purposes of the forced share, see J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD &
R. EFFLAND, supra note 23, at 123-25; Haskell, Restraints upon the Disinheritance of Family
Members, in DEATH, TAxES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 107 (E. Halbach ed. 1977); Kulzer, Property
and the Famiy: Spousal Protection, 4 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 195, 209-20 (1973).
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is interesting to note that Great Britain places discretion in the court to
change the dispositive terms of the decedent spouse's will or the intes-
tate division, as the case may be, if necessary to provide adequately for
the support of the surviving spouse who would otherwise be in need;
this is the only protection afforded the surviving spouse from disinheri-
tance.28 In this country we have chosen not to vest such discretionary
power in our probate courts for the purpose of support or any other
purpose. We adopted an inflexible fractional method and have chosen
to retain it despite suggestions that the flexible British approach is
preferable.29
As indicated above, in many states the forced share can be mini-
mized or avoided by the use of certain nonprobate transfers, and this
can be done without the property-owning spouse giving up any
financial benefit during his lifetime. For example, the property-owning
spouse may create a revocable living trust, retaining the life interest,
and having the principal pass to someone other than the surviving
spouse upon his death. Certain forms of "survivor" bank accounts or
bonds may also be used for this purpose. If the property-owning
spouse can disinherit the surviving spouse wholly or partially by such
means, and decides to do so, there is little or no need for a premarital
contract in which the surviving spouse waives her rights or settles for
less than she would be entitled to at law. Where the obvious purpose of
such devices, however, is to disinherit, there is always the possibility
that a court in the future will subject them to the forced share, and this
makes it advisable to obtain a waiver of rights in any event. Of course,
if such devices do in fact achieve their objective, the question of the
validity or invalidity of the premarital contract becomes irrelevant.3 °
28. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependent's) Act, 1975, c. 63. This statute also
protects children of the decedent. Similar flexible restraints on testation exist in New Zealand,
Australia and Canada.
29. See W. MACDONALD, supra note 23, at 290-327; Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85
U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936); Haskell, supra note 27; Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary
Freedom-A Report on Decedent's Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1955);
Note, Family Maintenance." An Inheritance Schemefor the Living, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 673 (1977).
30. There is authority for the proposition that if an antenuptial contract provides for a certain
fraction of the estate to the surviving spouse in lieu of her rights at law, substantial inter vivos gifts
made for the purpose of defeating the contract are voidable. Dubin v. Wise, 41 IlI. App. 3d 132,
354 N.E.2d 403 (1976); Eaton v. Eaton, 233 Mass. 351, 124 N.E. 37 (1919); Dickinson v. Lane, 193
N.Y. 18, 85 N.E. 818, 102 N.Y.S. 1134 (1908).
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III. 'WHY THE LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED
It is the opinion of the writer that the prevailing common law al-
ternative criteria for validity of premarital estate contracts of substan-
tive fairness or fairness in the making of the contract, the Uniform
Probate Code sole criterion of fair disclosure, and the other judicial
criteria described above, are unsound. The law should require for en-
forceability that the contractual provision for, or the uncompensated
waiver by, the surviving spouse be fair to her as of the time of the
decedent spouse's death based upon the survivor's accustomed living
standard. The surviving spouse's property and her capacity to earn a
living would be salient considerations in the determination of the fair-
ness of the contract. Another consideration would be the needs of the
decedent spouse's children. It should be emphasized that the contract
may be fair as of the decedent spouse's death although the surviving
spouse has waived her forced share without any compensation therefor,
if she has independent means or is capable of earning a living which
will support her adequately in accordance with her customary living
standard. The upshot is that the surviving spouse should not be de-
prived of her interest in the decedent spouse's estate if this means that
she becomes a burden on her children or other relatives or has to look
to the state for support. The writer believes it is contrary to public
policy to enforce a contract in the context of the marital relationship
which deprives one of the parties of his or her rights under legislation
enacted for his or her financial protection if this results in hardship.
Such legislation was enacted because of the unique characteristics of,
and special responsibilities which attach to, the marital relationship in
our culture.
It may be that the surviving spouse is capable of supporting herself
adequately but has kept house and raised the children over a period of
years, thereby contributing indirectly to the decedent spouse's accumu-
lated wealth. A good argument can certainly be made that the premar-
ital contract barring any claim to the decedent's spouse's estate is unfair
in this situation and should not be enforced. The reason for denying
enforceability in this circumstance is, in the writer's opinion, less com-
pelling than in the situation in which the survivor is in need of support,
and consequently it is not proposed that contractual freedom be limited
in this circumstance. The idea of marital sharing as a basis for the
surviving spouse's rights in the estate of the decedent spouse is always
applicable, but it is not proposed that premarital contractual freedom
be limited in the interest of that objective.
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The question to be answered is why two adult individuals about to
be married should not be free to contract away their rights in the estate
of the other. Freedom of contract is a fundamental principle of our
legal system, but of course it is subject to numerous qualifications in the
interest of societal objectives which are deemed to be of greater impor-
tance. Nowhere is this more evident than in the marital relationship.
Marriage is essentially a status consisting of rights and duties imposed
by law, most of which are not modifiable by contract. 31 Some, how-
ever, are modifiable by agreement of the parties if certain conditions
are complied with. The statutory forced share in the estate of the dece-
dent spouse is such a modifiable attribute if certain conditions are met.
The writer's position is that the conditions are not stringent enough.
Many of the legal attributes of marriage, such as support, alimony,
property division on divorce, and the forced share, are premised to a
substantial degree on the existence of the traditional family in which
the husband has a productive vocation and the wife keeps house and
raises the children, leaving the wife in her middle and late years with-
out the capability of earning an adequate living. It is now fashionable
to declare that the "liberation" of women from the home calls for a
change in the legal attributes of the marital relationship, or at least a
relaxation of the rules which restrict the modification of these attributes
by contract.32 Not all women, however, have chosen to be liberated
from the home, and those that think they are may have a change of
heart after some years of marriage. Financial dependence is still a fact
of life for many married women. It may be premature to adjust radi-
cally the legal attributes of marriage to the condition of the "new wo-
man." This is said without any implied value judgment concerning the
contemporary trend.
It is not the purpose of this article, nor is it within the capacity of
the writer, to deal broadly with the relationship between the law of
31. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 587 (1932) provides: "A bargain between married per-
sons or persons contemplating marriage to change the essential incidents of marriage is illegal."
For a discussion of the power to modify the marital relationship by contract, see C. FOOTE, R.
LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 891-900 (1976). See also 6A
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1474 (1962); H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 30-32, 58-67
(1977); Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 441 (1976).
32. See Fleischmann, Marriage by Contract: Defining the Terms ofRelationsho, 8 FAM. L.Q.
27 (1974); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnershi Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective andInequita-
ble Law ofSupport, 35 OHIO ST. L.J 558 (1974); Weitzman, Legal Regulation ofMarriage: Tradi-
tion and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974); Comment, Marriage as Contract: Towards a
Functional Redefinition ofthe Marital Status, 9 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 607 (1973); Comment,
Marital Contracts Which May Be Put Asunder, 13 J. FAM. L. 23 (1973); Note, Interspousal Con-
tracts: The Potentialfor Validation in Massachusetts, 9 SUFFOLK L. REV. 185 (1974).
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marriage and the vocational, economic, and social freedom that has
recently become available to women. The new opportunities for wo-
men, however, do not militate against the position that the premarital
contract settling property rights at death must in all events be
financially fair at the time it is operative, because circumstances pre-
vent many women from exploiting these opportunities. The new free-
dom for women bears on the issue, however, in the respect that it is
more likely in the future that the widow will be capable of supporting
herself after her husband's death, and that as a consequence her waiver
of her rights in his estate will meet the proposed test of fairness as of
the time of the husband's death. There can be little doubt, however,
that many women are going to need the protection of the statutory
forced share, the new freedom notwithstanding.
Given that many women will continue to need protection against
disinheritance because of their role as housewife and the consequent
lack of vocational opportunity, the question remains why they should
not be permitted to contract away this protection if they are fully in-
formed and know what they are giving up when they sign the contract.
The issue is the relative importance of contractual freedom and this
particular legal attribute of the marriage relationship. Some of the at-
tributes of the marital relationship imposed by law are not modifiable
by contract and others are modifiable only under certain circumstances
because the state has a great interest in the maintenance of such attri-
butes. The interspousal obligation of support during marriage is one
such nonmodifiable attribute. If the parties could contract away the
obligation of support regardless of the need of the party otherwise enti-
tled to support, it would seem there would be little meaning to the insti-
tution of marriage for the parties who did so. At its best, marriage is a
voluntary sharing, and at least it is a legal commitment of support. In
economic terms, the state's interest is in seeing to it that individuals do
not become a burden on others or the state treasury. In broader social
terms, however, the state's interest is the viability of the institution of
marriage which is considered by most to be fundamental to an orderly
and moral society. If there is no responsibility, there is little' substance
to the relationship. The state cannot enforce emotional support, but it
can enforce financial support. If man and woman choose to live to-
gether without legal commitment, they are, as a practical matter, free to
do so in these times without interference by the state. If for any reason
the parties wish the benefit of marital status, the responsibility of sup-
port must be accepted.
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The marital attribute of the forced share in the decedent spouse's
estate is a form of marital sharing, albeit after the fact. It is suggested
that responsibility for providing for the surviving spouse contributes to
the viability of the institution of marriage. Stating it another way, to
allow the parties to contract away protection regardless of need is to
detract from the marriage commitment and to erode the institution of
marriage to that extent.
The position taken in this article is obviously premised upon the
value of the institution of marriage and the interest of the state in main-
taining it substantially in its traditional legal form. If one disregards
the complicating factor of the upbringing of children, one can easily
imagine a society in which men and women paired off informally or
contractually, without benefit or burden of the legal consequences of
marriage as we know them other than those contracted for. Whether
this would be conducive to a happy or stable society is something else
again. It certainly would offer gratification without responsibility,
which qualifies as the underlying principle of social decadence. Of
course, if children are involved, another social and moral dimension
appears, and the free-wheeling nonmarital relationship presumably
loses some of its attractiveness, unless one is willing to delegate their
upbringing to the state, an alternative of vast ramifications.
It is of interest to compare the manner in which the courts have
dealt with the premarital divorce contract. The traditional judicial re-
sponse has been that premarital contracts waiving or specifying ali-
mony or property division or both upon divorce are contrary to public
policy and void.33 The reasoning that has often been used to support
this position is that such contracts, if enforceable, would be conducive
to the dissolution of the marriage because they make divorce less oner-
ous than it otherwise would be. This is certainly true if alimony and
property division are waived, at least for the partner who benefits. If
alimony and property division are not waived but specified, then the
financial consequences of divorce are made more certain, and possibly
less onerous, and in either event divorce is thereby facilitated.
In recent years some jurisdictions have adopted the position that
33. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 217 Ga. 234, 123 S.E.2d 115 (1961); In re Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d
586 (Iowa 1973); Stratton v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916); Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 740,
121 A.2d 704 (1956); Scherba v. Scherba, 340 Mich. 228, 65 N.W.2d 758 (1954); Crouch v. Crouch,
53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964); Kunde v. Kunde, 52 Wis. 2d 559, 191 N.W.2d 41
(1971). See also H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 28; 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 5, § 90 at 26.
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premarital contracts waiving or specifying alimony and property divi-
sion on divorce are valid under certain circumstances.34 Some courts
have held that the premarital contract concerning divorce is valid if
there is compliance with the alternative conditions which attach to the
validity of the premarital contract concerning property rights at death,
Le., substantive fairness determined at the time of contracting, or ade-
quate knowledge of the spouse's property and its value and the absence
of inordinate pressure to agree to the settlement." Other courts have
spoken broadly of the requirement of fairness, with emphasis upon dis-
closure.36 Some courts which validate the premarital contract on di-
vorce have held that the contract is subject to judicial modification if
circumstances have changed from the time of the contract to the time of
the divorce or thereafter.37 This enables the court to require fairness at
the time the contract becomes operative, provided there has been a
change in circumstances.
The judicial power of modification of the premarital divorce con-
tract in the event its terms are unfair at the time of the divorce, as
recognized by several courts, suggests that a similar power to modify
may be appropriate with respect to the premarital estate contract which
is found to be unfair at the death of the decedent spouse under the rule
proposed in this article. If the settlement is unfair, the alternatives are
to declare it invalid, leaving the surviving spouse to his or her forced
share, or to modify it to make it fair within the limits of the forced
34. Hughes v. Hughes, 251 Ark. 63, 471 S.W.2d 355 (1971); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33
Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. Volid,
6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d
600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1972); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80
Wash. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972). Zn re Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1973), held that prenuptial settlement of property rights on divorce is valid but settlement of
alimony is invalid.
35. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d
293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972).
36. Hughes v. Hughes, 251 Ark. 63,471 S.W.2d 355 (1971); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386,
286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Buettner v.
Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960); Unander
v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1972).
37. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352 N.E.2d 785
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1972). The following are
recent articles discussing the developing law concerning premarital divorce settlement: Branca &
Steinberg, AntenuptialAgreements Under Caifornia Law: An Examination of the Current Law and
In Re Marriage ofDawley, I 1 U.S.F.L. REv. 317 (1977); Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 692 (1972); Klarman, supra note 14; Note, The Impact of the Revolution in Geor-
gia's Divorce Law on AntenuptialAgreements, 11 GA. L. REv. 406 (1976).
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share. The former course would be consistent with the tradition of in-
flexibility with respect to marital property rights at death. It is pro-
posed, however, that modification would be the preferable result. If the
premarital contract which is found to be unfair is modified, it has sub-
stantial legal significance because it limits the survivor to something
less than the forced share.
The postmarital divorce contract has been treated in the same
manner as the premarital contract, unless it falls into the category of
the separation agreement. The contract between married parties en-
tered into after separation or upon the verge of separation, which set-
tles predivorce maintenance on separation and alimony and property
division on divorce, is generally recognized as binding if it is substan-
tively fair and if there was adequate disclosure and no overreaching.
Many cases have held that the agreement is modifiable by the court
upon divorce if the provision for the spouse is not adequate at that
time.38 The difference in treatment from the premarital contract is pre-
sumably justified on the ground that the agreement made after or im-
mediately prior to separation is not conducive to divorce because the
break-up has already occurred. It seems, however, that such agree-
ments also facilitate divorce.
The parties to the marriage cannot validly contract before or after
marriage concerning the duty of support while living together 9 or after
separation,' except that the separation agreement may validly provide
for support after separation.
IV. OBJECTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED TO THE PROPOSED CHANGE
Unquestionably the proposed rule that the premarital contract
must be substantively fair at the time of the decedent spouse's death
makes for uncertainty with respect to the rights of the parties. Whether
or not the contract is enforceable in accordance with its terms depends
38. H. CLARK, supra note 5, §§ 16.2, .10, .13.
39. In re Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973); French v. Mc-
Anarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); In re Estate of Muxlow, 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d
43 (1962); Lacks v. Lacks, 12 N.Y.2d 268, 189 N.E.2d 487, 238 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1963); Cord v.
Neuhoff, - Nev. -, 573 P.2d 1170 (1978).
40. In re Higgason, I0 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973); Belcher v.
Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972); Eule v. Eule, 24 111. App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974); French v.
McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); Holliday v. Holliday, - La. -, 358 So. 2d 618
(1978); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961). See also H. CLARK, supra note 5,
at 28; 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 5, § 90, at 27. But see In re Estate of Slight, 467 Pa. 619, 359 A.2d
773 (1976) (recognizing in dictum the validity of premarital settlements of marriage support
obligations).
38. H. CLARK, supra note 5, §§ 16.2, 16.2, .10, .13.10, .13.
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upon circumstances that cannot be known with any degree of certainty
at the time of the contract or during the marriage. Under existing law,
whether or not the contract is enforceable can be known, in theory at
least, at the time the contract is signed. In fact, however, there is con-
siderable uncertainty as to the validity of the premarital contract under
existing law because the requirements of substantive fairness at the
time of the contract or, in the absence of fairness, adequate disclosure
and nonoverreaching, leave much to the discretion of the judiciary.
Several of the courts which have recently upheld premarital con-
tracts concerning alimony and property division on divorce have re-
served the power to modify the contract if a change of circumstances
since the time of the contract renders it unfair. The traditionally valid
separation agreement has been held by many courts to be subject to
modification if found to be unfair at the time of the divorce or thereaf-
ter. Uncertainty is the necessary consequence of the protective attitude
which the courts have adopted in the area of contracts affecting ali-
mony and property rights on divorce and at death. It is a function of
the subordination of contractual freedom to a societal objective of
greater value.
This quality of uncertainty of enforceability is not unusual in the
law. A covenant restricting land to certain uses which is initially en-
forceable may be held to be unenforceable at a later date if a change in
the nature of the neighborhood makes it unreasonable or unfair to en-
force the covenant. An example would be a covenant restricting the
use of land to single-family residential purposes, entered into when the
surrounding area was residential, which covenant the promisee wishes
to enforce after the surrounding area has become predominantly com-
mercial.4 1 The body of contract law dealing with frustration of purpose
also provides many examples of legal obligations which cease to be
such because of circumstances which make it unfair or unreasonable to
enforce them. 2
In recent years many states have legislated what has come to be
known as "no-fault" divorce. This establishes as a ground for divorce
the "irretrievable breakdown" of the marriage, frequently with a re-
quirement that the parties live apart for a period of time to confirm the
41. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, §§ 9.22, .39; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 17,
§ 684.
42. 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1353-1361 (1962).
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existence of the breakdown. 43 The ground is in contrast to the tradi-
tional grounds of fault for divorce, such as adultery, desertion and cru-
elty. In effect, this legislation enables the parties to terminate the
marriage if it is not working. This legislation has been a response to
the greater demand for and social acceptability of divorce, and also to
the collusion and perjury which often are the consequence of the fault
grounds.' The question arises whether "no-fault" divorce militates
against the position advocated in this article.
"No-fault" divorce has no logical relationship to the legal attrib-
utes of responsibility during marriage and upon its termination by di-
vorce or death. It does not follow from the availability of easy divorce
that the marital attributes should be more freely modifiable contractu-
ally or that the institution of marriage has been devalued. "No-fault"
divorce simply manifests a recognition that no useful purpose is served
by making it difficult for people to dissolve their marriage when they
no longer wish to be married. There is no reason for it to be viewed as
a step in the development of the relaxation of the responsibilities im-
posed by law upon the parties to marriage, and a substitution therefor
of the regulation of the marital relationship by contract. It is submitted
that "no-fault" divorce serves a social objective which is wholly in-
dependent of the question of the responsibility of one marriage partner
for the financial security of the other during marriage, upon divorce or
after death.
Legal realists are likely to contend that although the common law
rule and the Uniform Probate Code rule concerning premarital con-
tracts dealing with property rights at death allow for financially unfair
treatment of the surviving spouse, nevertheless the court or jury has the
opportunity to invalidate the unfair agreement by finding that the dis-
closure was inadequate in some respect or that there was some form of
overreaching in the execution of the agreement. Certainly there is evi-
dence in the cases of this, but there are also cases of financially unfair
agreements which have been upheld; the cases discussed below are il-
lustrative of such results. In addition, the fundamental weakness of
43. For a listing of the states which have adopted the no-fault approach, in one form or
another, see Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Ffiy States:An Outline, 11 FAM. L.Q. 297 (1977). The
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 305 provides for divorce on the basis of irretrievable
breakdown. See also C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 31, at 1101-09, for a discussion
of recent developments in this area.
44. For a discussion of collusion and other undesirable aspects of divorce litigation under
traditional divorce law, see M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 51-




legal realist reasoning in this situation and others is that it does not take
into account the influence of the rule upon the decision to litigate or
compromise the dispute. In sum, rules remain important in our legal
system.
V. HARSH RESULTS AND JUDICIAL DIscRETIoN
The case of Christians v. Christians45 is an example of a result
which was financially harsh to the surviving spouse. Christina and
Charles were married in 1928, at which time she was forty-five and the
mother of six children by her former husband from whom she was di-
vorced in 1914, and he was fifty-eight and a widower with two adult
sons. Christina had received only ten dollars per month alimony and
had supported herself by cooking in hotels and other work. She had no
property.
Christina and Charles entered into a contract two days before the
marriage which provided that if Christina survived Charles she would
receive $5,000 from his estate in place of all rights which she would
otherwise have as a widow "either as dower. . or as a distributive
share of the personal property and estate." 46 At that time Charles' as-
sets had a value of about $20,000. Charles died in 1948, survived by
Christina, at which time his assets, which were substantially the same
as at the time of the marriage, had a value of about $75,000. Christina
brought this action against Charles' two sons as executors of Charles'
estate and individually, to set aside the antenuptial contract on grounds
that it was inadequate to provide for her and disproportionate to
Charles' worth, and that she was overreached and defrauded. The trial
court held that the contract was not fraudulent, was fair, and valid.
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision.
Charles made the contract because he wanted to assure that his
sons by his prior marriage would receive his estate. Christina testified
that she did not understand the size of Charles' estate or the rights of a
widow in the estate of her husband or the terms of the contract. The
contract was prepared by Charles' attorney, and Christina did not have
counsel of her own. Charles' attorney testified that before the signing
he explained the contract to her, and that she acknowledged to him that
Charles had disclosed the nature of his property to her.
The Iowa Supreme Court stated the law to be that the terms of an
45. 241 Iowa 1017, 44 N.W.2d 431 (1950).
46. Id. at 1019, 44 N.W.2d at 432.
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antenuptial contract must be fair and there must be disclosure and no
overreaching. Substantive fairness of the provision for Christina was to
be determined as of the time the contract was made, not at the time of
Charles' death. The court evidenced its awareness of the harshness of
the result as follows:
The difficulty in this case is not with the 1928 antenuptial con-
tract but with the subsequent inflation which increased the money
value of Mr. Christians' property and depreciated the purchasing
power of plaintiff's $5,000 settlement. That neither party to the con-
tract contemplated this change in conditions does not require the
cancellation of the contract. . . . The record does not show the pro-
vision for plaintiff was unjust or disproportionate to Mr. Christians'
worth in 1928.47
The court also concurred in the trial court's findings that there was
no concealment or overreaching by Charles, and that Christina was
aware of the effect of the contract upon her rights.
The result in Potter v. Collin48 may or may not strike one as harsh,
depending upon one's interpretation of the relationship between the
parties to the premarital contract. At the time of their premarital con-
tract Frederick Collin was eighty-one, twice unhappily married and di-
vorced, vigorous, domineering, and worth $1,800,000, and Dorothy
Reitz was forty-seven, once married and divorced, and relatively impe-
cunious. Dorothy had a high school education, held jobs as a book-
keeper, secretary, and salesperson, and had a very small income from
an interest in a modest apartment building. The parties had dated for
several years prior to their marriage.
The contract was prepared by Frederick's lawyer and was re-
viewed by Dorothy's lawyer who advised that she not sign it because it
was a "bad business proposition." Frederick also furnished Dorothy
with a detailed disclosure of his assets. The contract provided that
Dorothy was to receive $20,000 from his estate in exchange for her
waiver of her statutory rights in his estate. The contract also provided
for a financial settlement in the event of divorce, and for specific
monthly amounts to be given Dorothy for various living expenses dur-
ing the marriage. Frederick died seventeen months after the marriage.
It was a happy marriage.
Dorothy brought the action to set aside the contract. The trial
47. Id. at 1022, 44 N.W.2d at 433-34.
48. 321 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cerl. denied, 336 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1976).
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court held the contract void, finding its terms so inadequate as to shock
the conscience of the court. The appellate court reversed the trial court.
The appellate court stated that the law of the state was that pre-
marital contracts settling rights in the estate of the parties are valid if
they are substantively fair, or, if not, if the parties were informed with
respect to the property of the other party and their rights at law in the
estate of the other. The court recognized that the provision for Doro-
thy was "seemingly unreasonable and penurious." It concluded, how-
ever, that Dorothy was fully informed at the time she entered into the
contract. The court summarized its position as follows:
[A]ny adult contemplating marriage who is sui juris can voluntarily
agree to take all, little, or nothing from his or her prospective
spouse's estate upon the latter's death, if the former is fully informed
at the time he or she so elects. This rule applies to women as well as
men. In this day and age there is no longer any suggestion that wo-
men are unequal and in need of the protection of the court.49
This was a clear case of disclosure and knowledge of rights, and
under the prevailing law, the court had little choice but to uphold the
contract. If one were to assume, however, that the facts of disclosure
were somewhat murky, it should be noted that the alternatives were the
validation of the contract providing the widow $20,000, or invalidation
resulting in the distribution to the widow of very substantial wealth
after a predictably brief marriage. It seems to make sense for the law to
allow a third choice, namely, modification of the agreement by the
court to make it financially fair, within the limits of the statutory rights
of the surviving spouse, as suggested above.
Kosik v. George5" is illustrative of the decisional discretion that
may be exercised by the court to avoid a result which would be
financially harsh to the surviving spouse. Earl and Marian executed a
contract three days before their marriage in which they waived their
rights in the other's estate. Earl was a sophisticated real estate busi-
nessman with assets of about $100,000, and Marian was a retail sales
clerk with a high school education and assets of about $4,000. Both
had been married and divorced and had children.
Earl's lawyer drafted the contract. It was never suggested to Mar-
ian that she should obtain counsel to review it. There never was any
formal disclosure of Earl's assets to Marian, but she knew he owned
real estate and was a "wealthy man." From conversation with Earl and
49. Id. at 132.
50. 253 Or. 15, 452 P.2d 560 (1969).
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his attorney, she understood in a very general way that she was giving
up her rights in his property, but no detailed or specific explanation of
the nature of those rights was made to her. They remained married
until Earl's death ten years later.
Earl died intestate with an estate of about $90,000. After the mar-
riage Earl purchased a home for them valued at $14,500, and placed
the title in their names as tenants by the entirety. Earl also made Mar-
ian a beneficiary on a $5,000 insurance policy on his life.
Earl's daughter brought an action for a declaratory judgment that
Marian had waived her rights in Earl's estate by the premarital con-
tract. The trial court held the contract to be void, and the Supreme
Court of Oregon affirmed, reasoning as follows:
Where, by the terms of a prenuptial agreement, the provision for
the wife as the survivor is clearly disproportionate to the husband's
wealth, it raises a presumption of designed concealment, and places
the burden on those claiming under it in his right to show that there
was a full knowledge and understanding on the part of the wife at the
time of execution of all the facts materially affecting her interests,
viz., the extent of his wealth and her rights in his property as his
survivor, and how modified by the proposed agreement ....
We deem it unnecessary to decide whether defendant had ade-
quate knowledge of the worth of Mr. George before she signed the
prenuptial contract and before entering into the marriage, but we do
hold that George breached the fiduciary relationship existing be-
tween him and the defendant by securing her signature to the pro-
posed agreement without first according to defendant a reasonable
opportunity to learn what property rights she would have as his wife
(and potentially as his widow) that would be altered or extinguished
by the agreement.
The fact that the parties were engaged, coupled with a wide dis-
parity in their business experience, knowledge and financial worth,
invoked a responsibility in George and his attorney to fully inform
defendant regarding the consequences to executing the agreement
proferred to her, a duty that was neglected. The agreement was
therefore invalid.51
There is little doubt that a court could have found that Marian was
adequately informed, but the manner in which the contract was "nego-
tiated" made the widow the sympathetic favorite of the court, despite
the tenancy by the entirety property and the life insurance policy.
The overwhelming majority of cases concerning the validity of
premarital estate contracts involve parties in their middle or late years
51. Id. at 22-23, 452 P.2d at 563-64.
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who have been previously married and one or both of whom have chil-
dren.52 Although frequently the contract provides for waiver of rights
by both parties, the party challenging the validity of the contract is al-
most invariably the widow, which is attributable to the greater life ex-
pectancy of women, to the fact that in most cases the wife is younger
than the husband, and to the fact that usually the husband has accumu-
lated property and the wife has not. The cases discussed above are
typical in these respects.
It is the writer's impression that only a small minority of the cases
arrive at a result which is harsh to the surviving spouse. In a majority
of the cases in which the premarital waiver is upheld against the
widow's challenge, she appeared to have had enough to live on from
her own property or had been provided for otherwise by the decedent
or was capable of supporting herself adequately. Harsh results, how-
ever, do occur. There are also the unknown factors of suits that were
not brought because the law was unfavorable and settlements that were
made for the same reason.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law permits the total or substantial disinheritance of a surviv-
ing spouse if this has been contracted by the parties, provided the survi-
vor was adequately informed and not unduly pressured at the time the
contract was made. It is immaterial under the law that the survivor has
little or no property and is incapable of supporting herself adequately.
This is permitted despite a statutory policy prohibiting disinheritance
in the absence of contract.
It is the thrust of this article that premarital estate contracts should
not be enforceable if this results in financial hardship for the surviving
spouse, ie., if her property is inadequate for her support and she is not
capable of earning an adequate living in accordance with a reasonable
approximation of her accustomed standard. Freedom of contract
should be subordinate to the responsibility which inheres in the mar-
riage relationship, one aspect of which is provision for the survivor who
is in need. Contractual avoidance of marital responsibility has an ero-
sive effect upon the institution of marriage and should not be counte-
nanced by the law.
52. For an analysis of litigation in these terms, see Gamble, supra note 37, at 730.
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